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Abstract. We describe a novel approach for adapting an existing soft-
ware model checker to perform precise runtime verification. The software
under test is allowed to communicate with the wider environment (in-
cluding the file system and network). The modifications to the model
checker are small and self-contained, making this a viable strategy for
re-using existing model checking tools in a new context.
Additionally, from the data that is gathered during a single execution
in the runtime verification mode, we automatically re-construct a de-
scription of the execution environment which can then be used in the
standard, full-blown model checker. This additional verification step can
further improve coverage, especially in the case of parallel programs,
without introducing substantial overhead into the process of runtime
verification.
1 Introduction
While model checking is a powerful technique for software verification, it also
has certain limitations and deficiencies. Many of those limitations are related to
the fact that a model checker must, by design, fully isolate the program from
any outside effects. Therefore, for verification purposes, the program under test
is placed into an artificial environment, which gives non-deterministic (but fully
reproducible) responses to the program. The existence of this model environ-
ment immediately requires trade-offs to be made. If the environment model is
too coarse, errors may be missed, or spurious errors may be introduced. Creat-
ing a detailed model is, however, more costly, and the result is not guaranteed
to exactly match the behaviour of the actual environment either. Moreover, a
detailed model may be too rigid: programs are often executed in conditions that
have not been fully anticipated, and a certain amount of coarseness in the model
of the environment can highlight such unwarranted assumptions.
Many of those challenges are, however, not unique to model checking. In
the context of automated testing, the test environment plays a prominent role,
and a large body of work deals with related problems. Unfortunately, adapting
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the methods used in automated testing to the context of model checking is far
from straightforward. Making existing test-based setups easier to use with model
checking tools is a core contribution of this paper.
Both manual and automated testing are established, core techniques which
play an important role in virtually every software development project. In a
certain sense, then, testing provides an excellent opportunity to integrate rig-
orous tools into the software development process. A number of verification
tools specifically tailored for this mode of operation have seen great success in
the software development community, for instance the memcheck tool from the
valgrind suite. We show that it is possible to tap into this potential also with
a traditionally-designed software model checker: we hope that this will help put
powerful verification technology into the hands of software developers in a natu-
ral and seamless fashion. The second important contribution of this paper, then,
is an approach to build a runtime verification tool out of an existing software
model checker.
Our main motivating application is extending our existing software model
checker, DIVINE [1], with a runtime verification mode. In its latest version, DI-
VINE has been split into a number of well-defined, reusable components [11] and
this presented an opportunity to explore the contexts in which the new com-
ponents could be used. Based on this motivation, our primary goal is to bring
traditional (software) model checking and runtime verification closer together.
As outlined above, there are two sides to this coin. One is to make model check-
ing fit better into existing software development practice, the second is to derive
powerful runtime verification tools from existing model checkers. To ensure that
the proposed approach is viable in practice, we have built a prototype implemen-
tation, which allowed us to execute simple C and C++ programs in the resulting
runtime verifier.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes prior art
and related work, while Section 3 lays out our assumptions about the model
checker and its host environment. Section 4 describes adapting a model checker
to also work as a runtime verifier and Section 5 focuses on how to make use of
data gathered by the runtime verifier in the context of model checking. Section 6
describes our prototype implementation based on DIVINE (including evaluation)
and finally, Section 7 summarises and concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
There are two basic approaches to runtime verification [3]: online (real time)
monitoring, where the program is annotated and, during execution, reports its
actions to a monitor. In an offline mode, the trace is simply collected for later
analysis. Clearly, an online-capable tool can also work in offline mode, but the
reverse is not always true. An extension of the online approach allows the pro-
gram to be monitored also in production, and property violations can invoke a
recovery procedure in the program [7]. Our work, in principle, leads to an on-
line verifier, albeit with comparatively high execution overhead, which makes it,
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in most cases, unsuitable for executing code in production environments. De-
pending on the model checker used, it can, however, report violations to the
program and invoke recovery procedures and may therefore be employed this
way in certain special cases.
Since our approach leads to a runtime verification tool, this can be compared
to other such existing tools. With the exception of valgrind [8], most tools
in this category focus on Java programs. For instance, Java PathExplorer [4]
executes annotated Java byte code, along with a monitor which can check var-
ious properties, including past-time LTL. Other Java-based tools include Java-
MOP [5] with focus on continuous monitoring and error recovery and Java-
MaC [6] with focus on high-level, formal property specification.
Our replay mode (described in Section 5) is also related to the approach de-
scribed in [2], where data collected at runtime is used to guide the model checker,
with the aim of reducing the size of the state space. In our case, the primary
motivation is to use the model checker for verifying more complex properties
(including LTL) and to improve coverage of runtime verification.
3 Preliminaries
There are a few assumptions that we need to make about the mode of operation
of the model checker. First, the model checker must be able to restrict the
exploration to a single execution of the program, and it must support explicitly-
valued operations. The simplest case is when the model checker in question is
based on an explicit-state approach (we will deal with symbolic and/or abstract
values in Section 3.1). If all values are represented explicitly in the model checker,
exploration of a single execution is, in a sense, equivalent to simply running the
program under test. Of course, since this is a model checker, the execution is
subject to strict error checking.
3.1 Abstract and Symbolic Values
The limitation to exploring only a single execution is, basically, a limitation
on control flow, not on the representation of variables. The root cause for the
requirement of exploring only one control flow path is that we need to insert
actions into the process of model checking that will have consequences in the
outside world, consequences which cannot be undone or replayed. Therefore, it is
not viable to restore prior states and explore different paths through the control
flow graph, which is what normally happens in a model checker. It is, however,
permissible to represent data in an abstract or symbolic form, which essentially
means the resulting runtime verifier will also act as a symbolic executor. In this
case, an additional requirement is that the values that reach the outside world
are all concrete (the abstract representation used in the model checker would not
be understood by the host operating system or the wider environment). Luckily,
most tools with support for symbolic values already possess this capability, since
it is useful in a number of other contexts.
3
3.2 Environments in Model Checking
A model checker needs a complete description of a system, that is, including any
environment effects. This environment typically takes the form of code in the
same language as the program itself, in our case C or C++. For small programs
or program fragments, it is often sufficient to write a custom environment from
scratch. This is analogous to how unit tests are written: effects from outside of
the program are captured by the programmer and included as part of the test.
When dealing with larger programs or subsystems, however, the environment
becomes a lot more complicated. When the program refers to an undefined func-
tion, the model checker will often provide a fallback implementation that gives
completely undetermined results. This fallback, typically, does not produce any
side effects. Such fallback functions constitute a form of synthetic model envi-
ronment. However, this can be overly coarse: such model environment will admit
many behaviours that are not actually possible in the real one, and vice versa,
lasting side effects of a program action (for instance a change in file content) may
not be captured at all. Those infidelities can introduce both false positives and
false negatives. For this reason, it is often important to provide a more realistic
environment.
A typical model checker (as opposed to a runtime verifier) cannot make use
of a real operating system nor of testing-tailored, controlled environment built
out of standard components (physical or virtual machines, commodity operating
systems, network equipment and so on). A possible compromise is to implement
an operating system which is designed to run inside a model checker, as a stand-
in for the real OS. This operating system can then be re-used many times when
constructing environments for model checking purposes. Moreover, this operat-
ing system is, to a certain degree, independent of the particular model checker
in use. Like with standard operating systems, a substantial part of the code base
can be re-used when porting the OS (that is, the host model checker is akin to a
processor architecture or a hardware platform in standard operating systems).
Many programs of interest are designed to run on POSIX-like operating sys-
tems, and therefore, POSIX interfaces, along with the interfaces mandated by
ISO C and C++ are a good candidate for implementation. This has the addi-
tional benefit that large parts of all these specifications are implemented in open
source C and/or C++ code, and again, large parts of this code are easily ported
to new kernels. Together, this means that a prefabricated environment with
POSIX-like semantics is both useful for verifying many programs and relatively
simple to create.
In the context of a model checker, the kernel of the operating system can
be linked directly to the program, as if it were a library. In this approach, the
model checker in question does not need any special support for loading kernel-
like objects or even for privilege separation.
3.3 System Calls
In this section, we will consider how traditional operating systems, particularly
in the POSIX family, define and implement system calls. A traditional operating
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system consists of many different parts, but in our context, the most important
are the kernel and the user-space libraries which implement the operating system
API (the most important of these libraries is, on a typical Unix system, libc).
From the point of view of a user program, the libc API is the interface of
the operating system. However, many functions which are mandated as part of
this interface cannot be entirely implemented in the user space: they work with
resources that the user-space code is unable to directly access. Examples of such
functions would be read or write: consider a read from a file on a local file
system. If the implementation was done in the user space, it would need direct
access to the hardware, for instance the PCI bus, in order to talk to the hard
drive which contains the requisite blocks of data which represent the file system.
This is, quite clearly, undesirable, since granting such access to the user program
would make access control and resource multiplexing impossible.
For these reasons, it is standard practice to implement parts of this func-
tionality in separate, system-level code with a restricted interface, which makes
access control and resource sharing possible. In operating system designs with
monolithic kernels, this restricted interface consists of what is commonly known
as system calls.1 A system call is, then, a mechanism which allows the user-
space code to request that the system-level software (the kernel) executes certain
actions on behalf of the program (subject to appropriate permission and con-
sistency checks). The actual implementation of syscall invocation is platform-
specific, but it always involves a switch from user (non-privileged) mode into
kernel mode (privileged mode, supervisor mode or ring 0 on x86-style proces-
sors).
On POSIX-like systems, libc commonly provides a generic syscall function
(it first appeared in 3BSD). This function allows the application to issue syscalls
based on their number, passing arguments via an ellipsis (i.e. by taking advantage
of variadic arguments in the C calling convention). In particular, this means that
given a description of a system call (its number and the number and types of its
arguments), it is possible to automatically construct an appropriate invocation
of the syscall function.
3.4 Overview of Proposed Extensions
Under the proposed extensions, we have a model checker which can operate in
two modes: run and verify. In the run mode, a single execution of the program is
explored, in the standard execution order. We expect that all behaviour checking
(enforcement of memory safety, assertion checks, etc.) is still performed in this
mode. The verify mode, on the other hand, uses the standard model checking
algorithm of the given tool.
The system under test (the input to this model checker), then, consists of the
user program itself, along with the environment, the latter of which contains a
1 In microkernel and other design schools, syscalls in the traditional sense only exist
as an abstraction, and are implemented through some form of inter-process commu-
nication.
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Program
Fig. 1. A scheme of components involved in our proposed approach.
stand-in operating system. The situation is illustrated in Figure 1. The operating
system has 3 different modes:
1. a virtual mode, in which all interaction with the real world is simply sim-
ulated – for example, a virtual file system is maintained in-memory and is
therefore part of the state of the system under test; this OS mode can be
used with both run and verify modes of the model checker
2. a passthrough mode, which uses the vm syscall model checker extension to
execute system calls in the host operating system and stores a trace of all
the syscalls it executed for future reference; this OS mode can only be used
in the run mode of the model checker
3. a replay mode, which reads the system call trace recorded in the passthrough
mode, but does not interact with the host operating system; this OS mode
can be again used in both the run and verify mode of the model checker
4 Syscall Passthrough
In order to turn a model checker into a runtime verifier, we propose a mechanism
which we call syscall passthrough, where the virtual, stand-in operating system
(see Section 3.2) gains the ability to execute syscalls in the host operating system
(see also Section 3.3). Of course, this is generally unsafe, and only makes sense
if the model checker can explore a single run of the program and do so in order.
Thanks to the architecture of system calls in POSIX-like kernels, we only need
a single new primitive function to be implemented in the model checker (we will
call this new primitive function vm syscall from now on; first, we need to avoid
confusion with the POSIX function syscall, second, the model checker acts as a
virtual machine in this context). The sole purpose of the function is to construct
and execute, in the context of the host operating system, an appropriate call to
the host syscall function (the interface of which is explained in more detail in
Section 3.3).
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We would certainly like to avoid any system-specific knowledge in the im-
plementation of vm syscall – instead, any system-specific code should reside in
the stand-in OS, which is much easier to modify than the model checker proper.
To this end, the arguments to our vm syscall primitive contain metadata de-
scribing the arguments syscall expects, in addition to the data itself. That
is, vm syscall needs to know whether a particular argument is an input or an
output argument, its size, and if it is a buffer, the size of that buffer. The exact
encoding of these metadata will be described in Section 4.1, along with more
detailed rationale for this approach.
Finally, most of the implementation work is done in the context of the (stand-
in) operating system (this is described in more detail in Section 4.2). This is good
news, because most of the code in the operating system, including all of the code
related to syscall passthrough, is in principle portable between model checkers.
4.1 Model Checker Extension
The model checker, on the other hand, only needs to provide one additional
primitive. As already mentioned, we call this primitive vm syscall, and it should
be available as a variadic C function to the system under test. This is similar to
other built-in functions often provided by model checkers, like malloc or a non-
deterministic choice operator. While in the program under test, invocations of
such built-ins look just like ordinary C function calls, they are handled differently
in the model checker and often cause special behaviour that is not otherwise
available to a C program.
We would like this extension to be as platform-neutral as possible, while
maintaining simplicity. Of course not all platforms provide the syscall primitive
described in Section 3.3, and on these platforms, the extension will be a little
more complicated. Namely, when porting to a platform of this type, we need
to provide our own implementation of syscall, which is easy to do when the
system calls are available as C functions, even if tedious. In this case, we can
simply assign numbers to system calls and construct a single switch statement
which, based on a number, calls the appropriate C function.
Therefore, we can rely on the syscall system-level primitive without sub-
stantial loss of generality or portability. The next question to ask is whether a
different extension would serve our purpose better – in particular, there is the
obvious choice of exposing each syscall separately as a model checker primitive.
There are two arguments against this approach.
First, it is desirable that the syscall-related machinery is all in one place and
not duplicated in both the stand-in operating system and in the model checker.
However, in the virtual and replay modes, this machinery must be part of the
stand-in operating system, which suggests that this should be also the case in
the passthrough mode.
Second, the number of system calls is quite large (typically a few hundred
functions) and the functions are system-dependent. When the code that is spe-
cific to the host operating system resides in the stand-in operating system, it can
be ported once and multiple model checkers can benefit. Of course, the stand-in
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operating system needs to be ported to the model checker in question, but this
offers many additional advantages (particularly the virtual mode).
Now if we decide that a single universal primitive becomes part of the model
checker, we still need to decide the syntax and the semantics of this extension.
Since different system calls take different arguments with varying meaning, the
primitive itself will clearly need to be variadic. Since one of the main reasons for
choosing a single-primitive interface was platform neutrality, the primitive itself
should not possess special knowledge about individual syscalls. First of all, it
does not know the bit widths of individual arguments (on most systems, some
arguments can be 32 bit – for instance file descriptors – and other 64 bit – object
sizes, pointers, etc.). This information is crucial to correctly set up the call to
syscall (the variadic arguments must line up). Moreover, some pointer-type
arguments represent variable-sized input data (the buffer argument to write,
for example) and others represent output data (the buffer argument to read).
In both cases, the size of the memory allocated for the variable-sized argument
must be known to vm syscall, so that this memory can be correctly copied
between the model checker and the system under test.
vm_syscall( SYS_read,
_VM_SC_Out | _VM_SC_Int32, &read,
_VM_SC_In | _VM_SC_Int32, fd,
_VM_SC_Out | _VM_SC_Mem, length, buffer,
_VM_SC_In | _VM_SC_Int32, length );
Fig. 2. An example invocation of vm syscall performing a read passthrough.
For these reasons, the arguments to vm syscall also contain metadata: for
each real argument that ought to be passed on to syscall, 2 or 3 arguments
are passed to vm syscall. The first one is always type information: whether the
following argument is a scalar (32b or 64b integer) or a pointer, whether it is
an input or an output. If the value is a scalar input, the second argument is
the value itself, if it is a scalar output, the following argument is a pointer to
an appropriate-sized piece of memory. If the value is a pointer, the size of the
pointed-to object comes second and the pointer itself comes third. An exam-
ple invocation of vm syscall is shown in Figure 2. The information passed to
vm syscall this way is sufficient to both construct a valid call to syscall and
to copy inputs from the system under test to the host system and pass back the
outputs.
4.2 Operating System Extension
The vm syscall interface described above is a good low-level interface to pass
syscalls through to the host operating system, but it is very different from the
usual POSIX way to invoke them, and it is not very intuitive or user-friendly ei-
ther. It is also an unsafe interface, because wrong metadata passed to vm syscall
can crash the model checker, or corrupt its memory.
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The proper POSIX interface is to provide a separate C function for each
syscall, essentially a thin wrapper that just passes the arguments along. Calling
these dedicated wrappers is more convenient, and since they are standard C
functions, their use can be type-checked by the compiler. In the virtual mode
of the operating system, those wrappers cause the execution to divert into the
kernel. We can therefore re-use the entire libc without modifications, and im-
plement syscall passthrough at the kernel level, where we have more control over
the code.
In our OS design, the kernel implements each system call as a single C++
method of a certain class (a component). Which exact components are activated
is decided at boot time, and it is permissible that a given system call is imple-
mented in multiple components. Since the components are arranged in a stack,
the topmost component with an implementation of a given system call “wins”.
In this system, implementing a passthrough mode is simply a question of im-
plementing a suitable passthrough component and setting it up. When libc
invokes a system call, the control is redirected into the kernel as usual, and the
passthrough component can construct an appropriate invocation of vm syscall.
This construction requires the knowledge of a particular system call. Those
are, luckily, more or less standardised by POSIX and the basic set is therefore
reasonably portable. Moreover, we already need all of this knowledge in the
implementation of the virtual mode, and hence most of the code related to the
details of argument passing can be shared. As mentioned earlier, this means that
the relevant libc code and the syscall mechanism it uses internally is identical
in all the different modes of operation. The passthrough mode is, therefore,
implemented entirely in the kernel of the stand-in operating system.
4.3 Tracing the Syscalls
The architecture of syscall passthrough makes it easy to capture argument values
and results of every invoked syscall, in addition to actually passing it on to
the host operating system. Namely, the implementation knows exactly which
arguments are inputs and which are outputs and knows the exact size of any
buffer or any other argument passed as a pointer (both input and output). This
allows the implementation to store all this data in a file (appending new records
as they happen). This file can then be directly loaded for use in the replay mode
of the stand-in operating system.
5 Syscall Replay
In a model checker, all aspects of program execution are fully repeatable. This
property is carried over into the virtual operating mode (as described in this
paper), but not into the passthrough mode. System calls in the host operating
system are, in general, not repeatable: files appear and disappear and change
content, network resources come and go and so on, often independently of the
execution of the program of interest.
9
What the passthrough mode can do, however, is recording the answers from
the host operating system (see Section 4.3). When we wish to repeat the same
execution of the program (recall that everything apart from the values coming
from vm syscall is under the full control of the model checker), we do not need to
actually pass on the syscalls to the host operating system: instead, we can read off
the outputs from a trace. This is achieved by simply replacing all invocations of
vm syscall by a different mechanism, which we will call replay syscall. This
new function looks at the trace, ensures that the syscall invoked by the program
matches the one that comes next in the trace and then simply plays back the
effects observable in the program. Since the program is otherwise isolated by
the model checker, those effects are limited to the changes the syscall caused in
its output parameters and the value of errno. The appropriate return value is
likewise obtained from the trace.
5.1 Motivation
There are two important applications of the replay mode. First, if the model
checker in question provides interactive tools to work with the state space, we can
use those tools to look at real executions of the program, and in particular, we can
easily step backwards in time. That is, if we have an interactive simulator (like,
for example, presented in [10]), we can derive a reversible debugger essentially
for free by recording an execution in the passthrough mode and then exploring
the corresponding path through the state space in the replay mode.
Second, if the behaviour of the program depends on circumstances other than
the effects and return values of system calls, it is often the case that multiple
different executions of the program will result in an identical sequence of system
calls. As an example, if the program contains multiple threads, one of which
issues syscalls and others only participate in computation and synchronisation,
the exact thread interleaving will only have a limited effect on the order and
arguments of system calls, if any. The model checker is free to explore all such
interleavings, as long as they produce the same syscall trace.
That this is a practical ability is easily demonstrated. A common problem
is that a given program, when executed in a controlled environment, sometimes
executes correctly and other times incorrectly. In this case, by a controlled envi-
ronment we mean that files and network resources did not change, and that the
behaviour of the program does not depend on the value of the real-time clock.
Therefore, we can reasonably expect the syscall trace to be identical (at least
up to the point where the unexpected behaviour is encountered). If this is the
case, the model checker will be able to reliably detect the problem based on a
single syscall trace, regardless of whether the problem did or did not appear
while running in the passthrough mode.
5.2 Constructing the State Space
As explained above, we can use the replay mode to explore behaviours of the
program that result in an identical syscall trace, but are not, computation-wise,
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identical to the original passthrough execution. In this case, it is important
that the model checker explores only executions with this property. A primitive
which is commonly available in model checkers and which can serve this purpose
is typically known as assume2. The effect of this primitive is to instruct the
model checker to abandon any executions where the condition of the assume
does not hold. Therefore, our replay syscall, whenever it detects a mismatch
between the syscall issued by the program and the one that is next in the trace, it
can simply issue assume( false ). The execution is abandoned and the model
checker is forced to explore only those runs that match the external behaviour
of the original.
5.3 Causality-Induced Partial Order
The requirement that the traces exactly match up is often unnecessarily con-
straining. For instance, it is quite obvious that the order of two read operations
(with no intervening write operations) can be flipped without affecting the out-
come of either of the two reads. In this sense, such two reads are not actually
ordered in the trace. This means that the trace does not need to be ordered
linearly – the two reads are, instead, incomparable in the causal ordering. In
general, it is impossible to find the exact causal relationships between syscalls,
especially from the trace alone – a write to a file may or may not have caused
certain bytes to appear on the stdin of the program. We can, however, con-
struct an approximation of the correct partial order, and we can do so safely:
the constructed ordering will always respect causality, but it may order certain
actions unnecessarily strictly.
We say that two actions a and b (system call invocations) commute if the
outcome of both is the same, regardless of their relative ordering (both a and
b have the same individual effect, whether they are executed as a, b or as b, a).
Given a sequence of system calls that respects the causal relationships, swapping
two adjacent entries which commute will lead to a new sequence with the same
property. We can obtain an approximate partial order by constructing all such
sequences and declaring that a < b iff this is the case in all of the generated
sequences.
6 Prototype Implementation
We have implemented the approach described in this paper, using the DIVINE 4
software model checker as a base. In particular, we rely on the DiVM component
in DIVINE, which is a verification-focused virtual machine based on the LLVM
intermediate representation (more details in Section 6.1). The architecture of
DIVINE 4, as a model checker, is illustrated in Figure 3. First, we have extended
DiVM with the vm syscall primitive (cf. Section 4). Taking advantage of this
2 The assume primitive is a counterpart to assert and has a similar interface. It
is customary that a single boolean value is given as a parameter to the assume
statement (function call), representing the assumed condition.
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extension, we have implemented the requisite support code in DiOS, as described
in Section 4.2. DiOS is a pre-existing stand-in operating system component which
originally supported only the virtual mode of operation. As part of the work
presented in this paper, we implemented both a passthrough and a replay mode
in DiOS.
User Program
DiVM
E
n
v
ir
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n
m
en
t
Libraries
DiOS
DIVINE 4
syscalls
hypercalls
Fig. 3. The architecture of DIVINE 4. The shaded part is, from a model checking
point of view, the system under test. However, DiOS and most of the libraries
are shipped as part of DIVINE.
In the rest of this section, we will describe the underpinnings of DIVINE 4 in
more detail. The first important observation is that, since DIVINE is based on
interpreting LLVM bitcode, it can use a standard compiler front-end to compile C
and C++ programs into the bitcode form, which can then be directly verified. We
will also discuss the limitations of the current implementation and demonstrate
its viability using a few examples.
6.1 LLVM Bitcode
LLVM bitcode (or intermediate representation) [9] is an assembly-like language
primarily aimed at optimisation and analysis. The idea is that LLVM-based anal-
ysis and optimisation code can be shared by many different compilers: a com-
piler front end builds simple LLVM IR corresponding to its input and delegates
all further optimisation and native code generation to a common back end. This
architecture is quite common in other compilers: as an example, GCC contains
a number of different front ends that share infrastructure and code generation.
The major innovation of LLVM is that the language on which all the common
middle and back end code operates is exposed and available to 3rd-party tools.
It is also quite well-documented and LLVM provides stand-alone tools to work
with both bitcode and textual form of this intermediate representation.
From a language viewpoint, LLVM IR is in partial SSA form (single static
assignment) with explicit basic blocks. Each basic block is made up of instruc-
tions, the last of which is a terminator. The terminator instruction encodes
relationships between basic blocks, which form an explicit control flow graph.
An example of a terminator instruction would be a conditional or an uncondi-
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tional branch or a ret. Such instructions either transfer control to another basic
block of the same function or stop execution of the function altogether.
Besides explicit control flow, LLVM also strives to make much of the data
flow explicit, taking advantage of partial SSA for this reason. It is, in general,
impossible to convert entire programs to a full SSA form; however, especially
within a single function, it is possible to convert a significant portion of code.
The SSA-form values are called registers in LLVM and only a few instructions
can “lift” values from memory into registers and put them back again (most
importantly load and store, respectively, plus a handful of atomic memory
access instructions).
6.2 Runtime Verification with LLVM
While LLVM bitcode is primarily designed to be transformed and compiled to
native code, it can be, in principle, executed directly. Of course, this is less
convenient than working with native code, but since the bitcode is appreciably
more abstract than typical processor-level code, it is more amenable to model
checking. The situation can be improved by providing tools which can work with
hybrid object files, which contain both native code and the corresponding LLVM
bitcode. This way, the same binary can be both executed natively and analysed
by LLVM-based tools.
6.3 LLVM Extensions for Verification
Unfortunately, LLVM bitcode alone is not sufficiently expressive to describe real
programs: most importantly, it is not possible to encode interaction with the op-
erating system into LLVM instructions. When LLVM is used as an intermediate
step in a compiler, the lowest level of the user side of the system call mechanism
is usually provided as an external, platform-specific function with a standard C
calling convention. This function is usually implemented in the platform’s as-
sembly language. The system call interface, in turn, serves as a gateway between
the program and the operating system, unlocking OS-specific functionality to
the program. An important point is that the gateway function itself cannot be
implemented in portable LLVM.
To tackle these problems, a small set of primitives was proposed in [11]
(henceforth, we will refer to this enriched language as DiVM). With these primi-
tives, it is possible to implement a small, isolated operating system in the DiVM
language alone. DIVINE already provides such an operating system, called DiOS
– the core OS is about 2500 lines of C++, with additional 5000 lines of code
providing virtual POSIX-compatible file system and socket interfaces. Our imple-
mentation of the ideas outlined in Section 4.2 can, therefore, re-use a substantial
part of the existing code of DiOS.
6.4 Source Code
The implementation consists of two parts. The model checker extension is about
200 lines of C++, some of which is quite straightforward. The DiOS extension is
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more complex: the passthrough component is about 1400 lines, while the replay
component is less than 600. All the relevant source code, including the entire
DIVINE 4 model checker, can be obtained online3.
6.5 Limitations
There are two main limitations in our current implementation. The first is caused
by a simplistic implementation of the run mode of our model checker (see Sec-
tion 3.4). The main drawback of such a simple implementation is that syscalls
that block may cause the entire model checker to deadlock. Specifically, this
could happen in cases where one program thread is waiting for an action per-
formed by another program thread. Since there is only a single model checker
thread executing everything, if it becomes blocked, no program threads can
make any progress. There are two possible counter-measures: one is to convert
all system calls to non-blocking when corresponding vm syscall invocations are
constructed, another is to create multiple threads in the model checker, perhaps
even a new thread for each system call. Only the latter approach requires addi-
tional modifications to the model checker, but both require modifications to the
stand-in operating system.
The second limitation stems from the fact that our current libc implementa-
tion only covers a subset of POSIX. For instance, the gethostbyname interface
(that is, the component of libc known as a resolver) is not available. This
omission unfortunately prevents many interesting programs from working at the
moment. However, this is not a serious limitation in principle, since the resolver
component from an existing libc can be ported. Many of the networking-related
interfaces are already present and work (in particular, TCP/IP client function-
ality has been tested, cf. Section 6.6).
Finally, a combination of both those limitations means that the fork system
call, which would create a new process, is not available. In addition to problems
with blocking calls, there are a few attributes that are allocated to each process,
and those attributes can be observed by certain system calls. For example, one
such attribute is the pid (process identifier), obtainable with a getpid system
call, another is the working directory of the process, available through getcwd.
Again, there are multiple ways to resolve this problem, some of which require
modifications in the model checker.
6.6 Evaluation
Mainly due to the limitations outlined in Section 6.5, it is not yet possible to use
our prototype with many complete, real-world programs. The domain in which
DIVINE has been mainly used so far are either small, self-contained programs
and unit tests for algorithms and data structures. Both sequential and parallel
programs can be verified. The source distribution of DIVINE includes about
600 test cases for the model checker, many of which also use POSIX interfaces,
3 https://divine.fi.muni.cz/2017/passthrough/
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leveraging the existing virtual mode of DiOS. As a first part of our evaluation, we
took all those test cases and executed them in the new passthrough mode, that
is, in a mode when DIVINE acts as a runtime verifier. A total of 595 tests passed
without any problems, 3 timed out due to use of blocking system calls and 9
timed out due to presence of infinite loops. Of course, since runtime verification
is not exhaustive, not all errors present in the 595 tests were uncovered in this
mode.
The second part of our evaluation was to write small programs that specifi-
cally test the passthrough and the replay mode:
– pipe, which creates a named pipe and two threads, one writer and one reader
and checks that data is transmitted through the pipe
– rw which simply creates, writes to and reads from files
– rw-par in which one thread writes data to a file and another reads and
checks that data
– network, a very simple HTTP client which opens a TCP/IP connection to
a fixed IP address, performs an HTTP request and prints the result
We tested these programs in both the passthrough mode and in the replay
mode. While very simple, they clearly demonstrate that the approach works. The
source code of those test programs is also available online4. Clearly, our verifier
incurs appreciable overhead, since it interprets the program, instead of execut-
ing it directly. Quantitative assessment of the runtime and memory overhead is
subject to future work (more complex test cases are required).
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have described an approach which allows us to take advantage of an ex-
isting software model checking tool in the context of runtime verification. On
one hand, this approach makes model checking more useful by making it usable
with real environments while retaining many of its advantages over testing. On
the other hand, it makes existing model checking tools useful in cases when run-
time verification is the favoured approach. The approach is lightweight, since the
modification to the model checker is small and self-contained. The other compo-
nent required in our approach, the stand-in operating system, is also reasonably
portable between model checkers. The overall effort associated with our approach
is small, compared to implementing two dedicated tools (a model checker and a
runtime verifier).
In the future, we plan to remove the limitations described in Section 6.5 and
offer a production-ready implementation of both a passthrough and a replay
mode in DIVINE 4. Since the results of the preliminary evaluation are highly
encouraging, we firmly believe that a runtime verification mode based on the
ideas laid out in this paper will be fully integrated into a future release of DIVINE.
4 https://divine.fi.muni.cz/2017/passthrough/
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